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THE 1988 JAPANESE INSIDER TRADING AMENDMENTS:
WILL JAPAN SEE RESULTS FROM THESE TOUGHER
LAWS?
WINIFRED SWAN*
1. INTRODUCTION
From the visitor's gallery, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the world's
largest stock market,1 appears nearly identical to its United States
counterpart in New York.2 It is, however, profoundly different at heart.
Japan has been called an "insider's heaven";3 until recently insider
trading' has been a way of life. Although Japan's markets5 are not
unique in this respect, as insider trading is quite prevalent internation-
ally,' the impact upon other markets is significant due to the enormous
size and power of the Tokyo Exchange.
For reasons discussed later in this Comment, the 1988 amend-
ments to Japan's Securities and Exchange Law ("SEL") radically re-
formed Japanese laws governing insider trading.7 This Comment will
* J.D. 1991, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B. 1986, Duke
University.
1 See Hiatt & Shapiro, Is Enormous Wealth Corrupting Japan?, Wash. Post,
Feb. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
2 See Chira, Japan's Different Stock Market, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1987, at Dl,
col. 1.
3 See Note, Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1296,
1302 (1986).
" Insider trading is defined as the use of material, non-public information by those
in privileged positions for their own personal gain. See Note, Extraterritorial Enforce-
ment of Rule 10(b)-5: Insider Trading in the International Equities Market, 12 SUF-
FOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 83, 86 (1988).
' There are eight exchanges in Japan - Tokyo, which is the largest, Osaka,
Nagoya, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Nigata and Sapporo. See Note, supra note 3, at
1303 n.50.
' For example, in Britain, stock prices of companies targeted for takeovers fre-
quently rise sharply at least one month prior to the official public announcement of the
transaction, although insider trading has been illegal in that country since 1980. "In
West Germany, where insider trading is not only tolerated but a term for insider does
not exist in the language, stock prices regularly rise before improved earnings reports."
Hong Kong's stock market has been likened to the Dodge City of international securi-
ties markets, as insider trades there are a way of life, despite laws to the contrary. See
Insider Trading Probes Having Global Domino Effect, Chicago Tribune, March 5,
1989, Business, at 13, col. 1.
I See generally Securities and Exchange Law, Law No. 25 of 1948 (as amended
in 1988), translated in K. OKAMURA & C. TAKESHITA, LAWS AND REGULATIONS
RELATING TO INSIDER TRADING IN JAPAN (1989) [hereinafter SEL].
(275)
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discuss these amendments, the events which led to them, their content,
and probable impact. Before the new law can be analyzed, however, it
is necessary to understand the old law, the reasons behind its ineffec-
tiveness, and why the Japanese government has failed to enforce it
fully. With this background, one can appreciate the extent to which the
new law's success hinges on its successful confrontation with insider
trading in the Japanese securities markets.
2. INSIDER TRADING LAWS PRIOR TO THE 1988 AMENDMENT
The pre-1988 laws which regulated insider trading, adopted dur-
ing the Allied Occupation of Japan, were modeled after provisions of
the United States' Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.8 Though these laws were imposed by the Allied Forces,
they remained in force long after their departure. Although the Securi-
ties and Exchange Law has been amended nearly twenty times since its
inception, it until recently9 closely mirrored American law. ° The cen-
tral provision of the original insider trading rules was SEL Article 58,
a general anti-fraud provision prohibiting the use of any fraudulent
device in conjunction with securities transactions."" This provision is
All of the SEL articles cited in this comment are as they appear following the
1988 amendments. I have used the 1988 amended version as this text reflects current
law, while still embodying the same basic meaning of the original language in the 1948
acts. Due to the recent enactment of these laws, the official English translation of these
1988 amendments has not yet been published. I have used a translation prepared in
Japan by Kuzami Okamura, Esq. and Chieko Takeshita, Esq., and compiled by the
Secondary Market Division of the Securities Bureau, Ministry of Finance. The transla-
tion was published by the Commercial Law Center, Inc. in Tokyo, and I believe that it
reflects a very reliable interpretation of the law.
a See Zoglin, Insider Trading in Japan: A Challenge to the Integration of the
Japanese Equity Market Into the Global Securities Market, 1984 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 419, 420. See 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78 (1988).
The 1988 Amendments have left these provisions largely undisturbed. Instead of
rewriting the law, the amendments have simply added to existing laws governing in-
sider trading.
10 "Indeed, several of the amendments have tracked post-1948 developments in
American securities law." Banoff, The Regulation of Insider Trading in the United
States, United Kingdom, and Japan, 9 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD., 145, 163
(1988). Moreover, Banoff notes, the Japanese still continue to pay close attention to
changes in American securities regulation. Id. at 164.
" Article 58 provides: No person shall commit any act set forth in the following
Items:
(1) employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of, or any other transaction with respect to, any security,
or trading in securities index futures and similar tradings, trading in se-
curities options and similar tradings, or trading in foreign market securi-
ties futures and similar tradings;
(2) obtain cash or other property by using a document or any other repre-
sentation which includes any false statement with respect to a material
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strikingly similar to Rule 10b-5 promulgated under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,12 the provision most often used to attack insider
trading in the United States.13 Unlike American courts, however, Japa-
nese courts have been unwilling to broadly apply and enforce the terms
of this provision. Japan's Ministry of Finance has only applied Article
58 to one case. 4 Additionally, although Article 197 of the SEL' 5 stipu-
lates that violations of Article 58 are punishable with as much as a
three year prison term as well as a civil fine, no one in Japan has
received a prison sentence for insider trading."
In addition to Article 58, SEL Article 501 "regulates the manage-
ment and employees of 'securities corporations' (brokers, dealers, and
underwriters) and gives the Minister of Finance the authority to pro-
hibit activities which prejudice the protection of investors, are detrimen-
matter or which omits to state any material fact necessary to make connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of, or any other transaction with respect to,
any security, or trading in securities index futures and similar tradings,
trading in securities options and similar tradings, or trading in foreign
market securities futures and similar tradings; or
(3) make use of a false market quotation for the purpose of inducing the
purchase or sale of, or any other transaction with respect to, any security,
or trading in securities index futures and similar tradings, trading in se-
curities options and similar tradings, or trading in foreign market securi-
ties futures and similar tradings.
SEL, supra note 7, art. 58.
12 The text of that law is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
11 See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
" The case of Nasu Io Kogyo is the only case to which Article 58 of the SEL has
been applied. That case is significant to insider trading only in that it defined the
meaning of "fraudulent device" in Article 58. The court held that term to mean "an act
of deceit, that is, an act serving the defendant or another's interest, by intentionally
inducing the plaintiff's justifiable reliance on his misrepresentation." Note, supra note
3, at 1298 n.14.
's SEL, supra note 7, art. 197.
16 Sanger, Insider Trading, the Japanese Way, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1988, at
D1, col. 3.
1" SEL, supra note 7, art. 50.
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tal to the fairness of transactions, or undermine the credibility of the
securities industry."'1 8 Despite their availability, sanctions for violations
of this provision also have never been invoked."
Finally, Article 189 of the SEL, like its United States counterpart,
Section 16(b),20 prohibits "short-swing" trading by officers and direc-
tors or principal shareholders (those owning ten percent or more of a
corporation's outstanding stock) and requires disgorgement of any prof-
its should such a trade be made. 1 In addition, Article 189, like section
16(b), provides for a derivative action should the corporation fail to
make a demand for recovery after a specified period of time.2 2 How-
ever, Article 189 varies from section 16(b) in that the former has been
largely ineffective at deterring short-swing insider trades, which re-
sulted from the repeal of Article 188 in 1953.23 Article 188, an ana-
logue of section 16(a),24 required officers and principal shareholders to
report their stock holdings as well as any changes in such holdings to
the Ministry of Finance. Absent this provision there was no way to
effectively monitor the trading activities of such corporate insiders.
That only two cases were ever brought under Article 189, as opposed to
the multitude of 16(b) cases brought in the United States, demonstrates
the inadequacy of the Japanese monitoring legislation.25
In addition to the above described SEL articles, the Ministry of
IS Banoff, supra note 10, at 165.
19 See Note, supra note 3, at 1299.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
21 Article 189 provides in relevant part:
(1) For the purpose of preventing an officer or a Principal Stockholder of
a company from making unfair use of confidential information obtained
by reason of his or its office or position in the company, if such person has
realized any profits from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase,
of his or its own account, of any Share Certificates or Similar Instruments
of such company listed on a securities exchange within any period of not
more than six months, such company shall have the right to demand the
recovery of such profits.
SEL, supra note 7, art. 189 para. 1.
11 SEL, supra note 7, art. 189 para. 2.
23 See Note, supra note 3, at 1300. The reason cited for Article 188's repeal was
its inefficiency.
The inefficiency was obviously caused by the fact that, unlike in the
United States, (i) since the Japanese corporate law does not require the
beneficial owner of the share to register in his own name, he could easily
get away from the reporting requirement; and (ii) since article 188 did not
provide for the public disclosure of the report, other shareholders could not
obtain the information that could be a basis for a shareholders' derivative
action.
Id. at 1300 n.26.
24 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982).
25 See Note, supra note 3, at 1300.
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Finance employed informal administrative warnings and guidance to
brokerage firms and listed companies to further stem insider trading."6
These informal procedures failed to achieve their stated purpose.
3. REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE PRE-1988 LAW
The provisions discussed above have survived the 1988 amend-
ments and remain largely intact. The current Japanese Diet2 7 has re-
tained these provisions because they do not deem the provisions' failure
to curtail insider trading to be attributable to an inadequacy in the
language of these laws. This assessment is bolstered by the effectiveness
of nearly identical laws currently in place in the United States. Perhaps
these nations' varying abilities to curb insider trading can only be un-
derstood in the context of Japan's unique business and political envi-
ronment and the ways in which the laws evolved in Japan.
The historical impetus for enacting these laws in Japan was en-
tirely different than in the United States. The United States statutes
were enacted as a part of a reform movement following the stock mar-
ket crash of 1929.28 Conversely there was no internal pressure for such
legislation in Japan. Instead, the Japanese laws arose as a result of the
Allied Occupation. Thus, there was no real public support behind en-
forcing the stricter securities laws.29
The Japanese business environment has differed greatly from that
of the United States. The substantial volume of acquisition and take-
over activity in the United States has provided an incentive to make
high stakes insider trades as a way of personally maximizing the profit-
ability of such a transaction. 0 Public resentment against these high-
rolling insider traders, such as Ivan Boesky, has led to a movement for
the enforcement of insider trading laws in the United States. However,
in Japan, there have been only a handful of corporate acquisitions in-
volving unrelated parties."1 Thus "the impetus for stronger enforcement
of insider trading laws, which largely arose in the United States as a
" See Zoglin, supra note 8, at 420; see also Note, supra note 3, at 1301 (for a
more detailed discussion of the types of procedures used by the Ministry of Finance).
' The Diet is Japan's parliamentary body.
's See Zoglin, supra note 8, at 421.
29 Id.
So Id.
Si The hostile takeovers that have dominated Wall Street are virtually nonexistent
in Japan because in Japan individuals view their shareholding rights as less important
than the rights of a company's workers. Because of this view, many of the shares on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange are never traded. Indeed selling stock is deemed by some to be a
betrayal. Given this stable shareholding system, hostile takeovers are effectively barred.
See Chira, supra note 2, at D1, col. 1.
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result of dramatic market movements preceding public announcement
of such activity," simply has been absent in Japan.
32
Japan also has different stock market related problems than the
United States. Japan's Ministry of Finance has traditionally been con-
sumed with the more prevalent problem of the manipulation of stock
prices. This uniquely Japanese problem is caused by the Tokyo stock
market's very thin float, which results from the stable shareholding
practice among various corporate and financial institutions in Japan:33
Because these institutions tend to hold each other's shares on
a long term basis to promote business relationships, an esti-
mated sixty to seventy percent of the outstanding shares on
the Tokyo Stock Exchange are removed from active trading.
In such a thin market, powerful investors and major broker-
age firms can exert a disproportionate influence on the price
of a company's shares by controlling a significant percentage
of the limited floating shares. 4
Given the magnitude of this problem, the Ministry of Finance's deci-
sion not to enforce Japan's insider trading laws may have been the best
allocation of limited resources. 5 As Larry Zoglin has observed in his
paper, Insider Trading in Japan: A Challenge to the Integration of
the Japanese Equity Market Into the Global Securities Market, the
much greater emphasis on insider trading in the United States may
simply reflect the concerns of a market at a more mature stage of
development. 6
In Japan there are also political obstacles to the increased enforce-
ment of insider trading laws. It has long been alleged that Japanese
politicians reap personal financial benefit by using insider information
provided by those seeking political favor. The most recent example of
such activity is the Recruit Scandal, which implicated many high rank-
ing officials within the Japanese government, including associates of
Prime Minister Noburu Takeshita and Finance Minister Kiichi
Miyazawa.37 At the heart of this scandal was Hiromasa Ezoe, founder
and former chairman of Recruit Co. In order to gain admission to Ja-
pan's tightknit business community, Ezoe offered extremely underval-
ued shares of his then unlisted subsidiary, Recruit-Cosmos Co., a real
3, See Zoglin, supra note 8, at 421.
83 Id. at 422.
34 Id.
35 Id.
S6 Id.
S7 Jimbo, Japan's Inside-Trading 'Tradition' Under Attack, Christian Sci. Mon-
itor, Sep. 13, 1988, at 12.
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estate concern, to nearly 200 politicians and businesspersons.38 Once
this subsidiary went public, these individuals were able to realize siza-
ble gains from the sale of their stock. Government officials alone alleg-
edly made profits ranging from 25 million to 100 million yen (about
$188,000 to $752,000)." 9 Those inside the Japanese business commu-
nity anonymously acknowledge that this practice is widespread, ° and
that Ezoe's only mistake was that he failed to be more subtle.
Japanese politicians have been unwilling to give up these lucrative
activities. Their reasons are more complex than personal financial ben-
efits, the insider activities have cemented strong relations between the
securities companies and the current ruling Liberal Democratic
Party.41 These relationships and the promise of continued financial
gains virtually preclude alterations in Japan's enforcement policy re-
garding insider trading regulations.
4. REASONS FOR THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1988 AMENDMENTS
Despite the myriad factors discouraging stricter enforcement of Ja-
pan's insider trading laws, the Japanese Diet, in May of 1988, passed
amendments which radically altered Japan's regulation of insider trad-
ing. Observers cite two primary reasons for this change.42 The first of
these is the increasing public resentment against insider traders in Ja-
pan, in part due to high publicity scandals that occurred within the
past several years. The second reason is the external pressure foreign
countries put on Japan to change its securities practices in order to
provide a fairer market to the ever-increasing number of foreign inves-
tors participating on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.43 These two factors
resulted in tremendous pressure on the Japanese Diet to reform Ja-
pan's regulation of insider trading.
The domestic public pressure to change insider trading laws did
not arise until September of 1987, the first time a major insider trading
scandal was publicized. This scandal involved Tateho Chemical Com-
pany and Osaka-based Hanshin Sogo Bank.44 One month after
Hanchin Sogo Bank helped rescue Tateho Chemical from financial dis-
"S Williams, A Primer for Japan's Latest Political Scandal, L.A. Times, April
16, 1989, Part V, at 2, col. 1.
, Jimbo, supra note 37, at 12.
40 Yemma, Japan Inc. Tries to Clean Up After 'Cleaning Up'. But Sleuths Are
Alert, Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 23, 1988, at 11.
41 Zoglin, supra note 8, at 422.
See, e.g., Shapiro, Japan Puts Insider Rules Into Effect, Wash. Post, Aug. 24,
1988, at Fl, col. 1.
43 Id.
44 See Jimbo, supra note 37, at 12.
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aster in August of 1987, Hanshin sold off 337,000 of its Tateho
shares shortly before the public announcement of Tateho's huge losses
in bond futures trading.46 Although this transaction was investigated
and securities regulators determined that Tateho had notified the bank
about its corporate loss prior to its public announcement, neither party
was charged with a violation. Despite public outcry and news-media
criticism, Japanese authorities determined that the action did not vio-
late existing securities regulations.
47
In the United States, this transaction would clearly have violated
Rule 10b-5.48 Although SEL Article 58 contains almost identical lan-
guage, Japanese securities officials were unwilling to interpret the stat-
ute as prohibiting this activity. The failure of Japanese officials to in-
terpret the statute in such a manner gave rise to Japan's first
significant public outcry over the government's inability to regulate the
problem of insider trading.
This concern was further substantiated by two additional major
scandals: the Sankyo Seiki/Nippon Steel scandal that occurred later in
1988"° and the Recruit-Cosmos scandal mentioned above. In the first
case, the share price of Sankyo Seiki Manufacturing, a music box
maker, rose by ten percent a few days prior to the public announce-
ment of the acquisition of eighteen percent of that company's shares by
Nippon Steel Company, the world's largest steelmaker. 50 An investiga-
tion by the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Ministry of Finance re-
vealed that as many as one hundred employees of both firms had per-
sonally profitted by trading on knowledge of the acquisition as much as
a week prior to its public announcement. 51 Again, however, no charges
were brought against any of these individuals.
Finally, in the same year, the Recruit-Cosmos scandal began to
unfold. Not only was the scandal newsworthy in Japan, it also received
worldwide media coverage. Stories about corruption in the Japanese
markets appeared nearly daily in major newspapers and television
broadcasts. This coverage made the Recruit-Cosmos the most damaging
45 See Note, supra note 3, at 1302.
46 See Jimbo, supra note 37, at 12.
47 Id.
48 See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). This case recog-
nized the inherent unfairness that arises when an individual uses information obtained
through his special relationship with a corporation for personal gain, while he knows
that the information is not available to the public. That case mandates that an individ-
ual in possession of material, non-public information must either disclose the informa-
tion, or abstain from trading on it.
"' See Jimbo, supra note 37, at 12.
60 Sanger, supra note 16, at Dl, col. 2. See also Jimbo, supra note 37, at 12.
51 Id.
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of the scandals.5" Moreover, the Recruit situation was even more scan-
dalous in that it implicated high level bureaucrats and government offi-
cials as well as businesspeople.
These three scandals quickly eroded Japanese public confidence in
governmental ability to regulate insider trading. However, public con-
cern within Japan over the adequacy of insider trading laws was not
the only impetus behind the passage of the 1988 SEL amendments.
The increasing globalization of the securities markets and the corre-
sponding pressure it created to improve the fairness of individual mar-
ketplaces also propelled the revisions.
The enormous size and power of the Japanese stock market mag-
nifies the impact of Japan's insider trading practices. The Tokyo Stock
Exchange is currently the largest securities market in the world, having
surpassed the New York Stock Exchange in volume and in market cap-
italization several years ago."3 Foreign activity in that market now com-
prises a significant level of all trades done, and is estimated to consti-
tute at least seven percent of Tokyo's daily volume. 54 Nearly every
major United States securities firm now has offices in Tokyo as well as
a membership with the Tokyo Stock Exchange.55 This indicates that
"[1]ocalized capital markets are increasingly becoming internationally
integrated."56
As foreign participation within Japanese equity markets continued
to grow, the disparity between Japanese and foreign enforcement of
insider trading became a greater source of concern. Many foreign inves-
tors felt shut out of the insider-run world often referred to as "Japan
Inc."' 57 To many, the market was unashamedly elitist in its approach
both to Japanese and non-nationals alike who were outside the magic
circle of well-connected Japanese businesspersons.58
The treatment of insider trading on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
was especially frustrating to American investors. Given the Securities
and Exchange Commission's worldwide ban on insider trading,,
American traders felt handcuffed; they could not make insider trades as
52 An editorial that occurred during that time period in the respected Asahi Eve-
ning News provides evidence of this public dissent. The broadcast stressed the "need to
speedily erase the impression that the Japanese stock market is an unclear market in
which insider trading is rampant." Shapiro, supra note 42, at Fl, col. 1.
53 Sanger, Big Board Chief Sees Shift in Tokyo, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1988, at
D4, col. 1. See also Chira, supra note 2, at Dl, col. 1, D6, col. 2.
See Holden, An Onslaught From the West, Bus. WK., Mar. 20, 1989, at 140.
'5 Chira, supra note 2, at D1, col. 1.
" Note, supra note 4, at 83.
5 See Williams, supra note 38, Part V, at 2, col. 1.
58 Id.
51 See Fingleston, A Bat Stirs Up the Village, EUROMONEY, Feb. 1989, at 17.
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the Japanese did, and the Japanese were unwilling to trade any other
way.
Japan's permissive attitude towards insider trading hampered all
foreign investors' abilities to fairly and accurately analyze a stock's fun-
damental values and market potentials. Given that foreign investment
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange benefited the Japanese economy, it was
necessary at a minimum for the Japanese Diet to create the appearance
of a change in policy towards insider trading so as not to discourage or
diminish further foreign trades in their market.
The first political response to these pressures came in October of
1987 with the creation of a subcommittee within the Securities and Ex-
change Council. The subcommittee served as an advisory body to the
Ministry of Finance to analyze and propose amendments to current
insider trading laws. 0 In February of 1988, this subcommittee, follow-
ing intense debates, presented its report to the Minister of Finance, and
within a month the report's recommendations were incorporated into
the first draft of the SEL amendments presented to the Japanese
Diet.6" The Diet quickly passed these proposals in May of 1988.62 By
February of 1989 the Diet had also promulgated all of the related cabi-
net orders and ministerial ordinances that accompanied the new laws.
63
All of these Japanese regulations became effective on April 1, 1989.4
5. THE 1988 SEL AMENDMENTS
The amendments focus on three areas. First, the new laws expand
the authority of the Minister of Finance to order a company "which
issues securities listed on a Japanese securities exchange to submit re-
ports and data" to her upon request. 65 Second, the laws impose report-
60 K. OKAMURA & C. TAKESHrrA, Laws and Regulations Relating to Insider
Trading in Japan 85 (1989).
61 The report was entitled "A Report on an Approach to the Regulation of In-
sider Trading". Its principal recommendations follow:
(1) developing an infrastructure to prevent insider trading, including self-
imposed regulations and the use of such devices as 'Chinese Walls',
(2) guidance from. the regulatory authorities regarding such self-imposed
regulations, and
(3) enforcement of external regulations against insider trading. The report
also recommended that the criteria used to regulate that activity "be
drafted with precision to place investors on notice of what activities are to
be considered unlawful.
See id. at 85-86.
62 Id. at 86.
82 Id. at 84.
6Id.
65 Id. at 83.
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ing obligations on officers and certain stockholders of listed companies
to report changes in their stock holdings.66 Finally, the new amend-
ments specifically prohibit insider trading and prescribe criminal sanc-
tions for violators.
67
6. EXPANSION OF THE MINISTRY'S AUTHORITY TO OBTAIN
INFORMATION FROM LISTED ISSUERS
SEL Article 154 was among the original laws enacted to regulate
insider trading during the Allied Occupation. 8 This provision enabled
the Minister of Finance to order a stock exchange to submit reports,
"for to inspect the operations and financial position of the stock ex-
change for the protection of investors when he [sic] deemed it neces-
sary." 9 Although this provision extended some authority to the Minis-
try to obtain information regarding activities on the stock exchange, the
Ministry had no ability to directly investigate the issuers of stock in-
, volved in suspicious stock transactions. In reaction to this problem, the
Diet amended Article 154 in 1988 to allow the Minister of Finance to
directly request information from listed issuers and the stock exchange
when investigating suspicious stock deals.70 This marked the first time
the Ministry of Finance would be able to conduct direct investigations
of companies involved in suspected insider stock trades.7" Unfortu-
nately, this power is limited in that under the new Article 154, the
Ministry itself cannot inspect an issuer's accounting books or other doc-
uments. Instead, it can only order a company to supply data from these
documents to the Ministry. In this respect, Article 154 falls short of
giving the Ministry of Finance complete investigatory power, but still
represents an important first step in broadening the Ministry's investi-
66 Id.
7" Id. at 83-84.
66 SEL, supra note 7, art. 154.
69 See Note, supra note 3, at 1304.
70 The amended language of Article 154 is as follows:
The Minister of Finance shall have the authority, when and if he deems it
necessary and appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors, to order a securities exchange or an issuer whose securities are
listed on such securities exchange to submit reports or data that may serve
as reference material with respect to the business operations or financial
condition of such securities exchange, and the authority to cause the ap-
propriate officials of the Ministry of Finance to inspect the business oper-
ations or financial condition of, or accounting documents or other items
belonging to, such securities exchange.
SEL, supra note 71, art. 154.
71 Failure to comply with a request by the Ministry to submit information can
result in a fine of not more than 300,000 yen. See SEL, supra note 7, art. 206.
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gatory authority.7
7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT FOR OFFICERS AND FINANCIAL
SHAREHOLDERS
In addition to expanding the Ministry of Finance's investigatory
ability, the new amendments also require officers and principal share-
holders of issuers to submit regular reports, even absent any specific
Ministerial request, regarding any changes to their stock holdings.7
The new amendments essentially reinstate former Article 188, repealed
in 1953, thereby empowering the Ministry to police short-swing trad-
ing by insiders more effectively.
Newly enacted Article 188 7 requires officers and principal stock-
holders (stockholders who are beneficial owners in their own or another
person's name, of at least ten percent of an issuer's total stock) to file a
report with the Minister of Finance with respect to any sale or
purchase of that issuer's stock made by them. 5 If such purchase or sale
is made through a securities company acting as a broker, the report
must be filed by the securities company responsible for the transac-
tion.7 If followed, Article 188 should provide some means of alerting
the Ministry to short-swing insider trades prohibited under already ex-
isting, but previously ineffectual, Article 189.77
Although this reporting provision represents a dramatic improve-
ment in the monitoring of short-swing trading, it is weaker than its
corresponding American Securities Exchange Act counterpart, Section
712 See Note, supra note 3, at 1310-11.
71 See SEL, supra note 7, art. 188.
7" The provision provides in relevant part:
If an officer or a Principal Stockholder (which shall mean, hereinafter
through Article 190-2, a stockholder who is the beneficial owner, under
his or its own name or under another person's name (including a fictitious
name), of not less than 10% of the total number of issued shares of
stock. . .) of a company purchases or sells. . .any share certificate, con-
vertible bond certificate, bond certificate with warrants to subscribe for
new shares or certificate representing the right to subscribe for new shares
of such company listed on a securities exchange, or any option with re-
spect to the purchase or sale transaction of any of such security. . .for his
or its own account. . ., such officer or Principal Stockholder shall file, by
the fifteenth (15th) day of the month following the month when such
purchase and/or sale. . .occurred, a report with respect to such purchase
and/or sale with the Minister of Finance. . ..
SEL, supra note 7, art. 188(1).
7 SEL, supra note 7, art. 188.
76 SEL, supra note 7, art. 188(2).
7" For a discussion of Article 189, as well as a translation of its language, see
supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
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16(a) 7 8 in two important respects. First, amended Article 188 is
weaker than the original provision which was repealed in 1953. For-
merly, Article 188 required directors and principal shareholders to re-
port their securities holdings upon becoming either an officer or princi-
pal shareholder, and whenever there were changes in their holdings.7
9
The current version only requires filing when they sell or purchase
securities.8" This weakened requirement may allow for more slippage
in the amount of compliance actually achieved by Article 188. Addi-
tionally, new Article 188 (along with its corresponding provision, Arti-
cle 18981) does not provide for automatic public disclosure of all sus-
pected short-swing trading violations. Instead, disclosure to the public
only occurs after the violation is confirmed with the accused person and
disclosed to the corporation. 82 Public disclosure is made only if both the
individual charged and the corporation fail to take action."3 The ration-
ale for this approach was that automatic public disclosure was thought
to be too stigmatizing to the alleged violator.8 ' The threat of such stig-
matization, however, is much of what deters short-swing trades. Absent
the threat of public stigma, there is no real deterrent to short-swing
trading violations, since disgorgement of profits85 merely leaves the vio-
lator in the same position that person would have been in without hav-
ing engaged in the transaction."
11 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982).
79 See Note, supra note 3, at 1311.
8S See SEL, supra note 7, art. 188. See also Note, supra note 3, at 1311.
81 See SEL, supra note 7, art. 189, paras. 4-9.
82 Id.
83 See id.
8 See Note, supra note 3, at 1311-12.
8" The method of calculating profits to be disgorged is described in Ministry of
Finance Ordinance No. 40 of 1988, art. 6, translated in K. OKAMURA & C.
TAKESHrrA, supra note 60. Note that when multiple trades have occurred within six
months, Japan does not use the lowest purchase, highest sale method of calculating
profits used in the United States. Rather, they simply match the earliest purchase with
the earliest sale, and so on, until purchases and sales can no longer be matched. See id.
at 66-67.
86 An additional criticism was made by Tomoko Akashi in his article, The Regu-
lation of Insider Trading in Japan. See Note, supra note 3, at 1311. Mr. Akashi
noted that:
Although a director or principal shareholder must file a report through as
securities company if the transaction is handled by that securities com-
pany, the principal obligation to report falls on the insider, not on the
securities company. Accordingly,. . . [the SEL] does not directly impose a
penalty upon a securities company for falling to report or for filing a false
report.
Id. However, this author also acknowledged that if "a securities company aids a viola-
tion by a person who has. a duty to report, it can be punished as an accomplice or
solicitor for violating the same provision." Id.
1991]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
The above problems associated with Article 188 will prevent it
from achieving the same success section 16(a) has achieved in the
United States. However, it does represent a significant improvement
over prior Japanese law, which had no filing requirement for officers
and principal shareholders.
8. DIRECT PROHIBITIONS AGAINST INSIDER TRADING
Finally, the Japanese Diet included among the new amendments
two provisions which specifically prohibit insider trading - Articles
190-2 and 190-3.87 Corresponding penalty provisions were also drafted
for a violation of either of these articles.88 Newly enacted Articles 190-2
and 190-389 represent Japan's first major departure from United States
securities law. Unlike the broad American provisions governing insider
trading, such as section 10(b)9" and Rule 10b-5,"1 these new Japanese
provisions specifically delineate what constitutes an insider trading of-
fense. Article 58, unlike its United States counterpart, Rule 10b-5, was
a failure in Japan. Owing in part to its vagueness, it had not been
invoked to curb insider trading. With this unfortunate history, the Jap-
anese Diet decided instead to create clear and specific prohibitions
against insider trading.92
Unlike Article 58 or its United States counterpart Rule 10b-5, the
provisions do not require proof of scienter, and are thus easier to en-
force.93 Proving a violation of either Article 190-2 or 190-3, requires a
showing that the individual knew she was in possession of material
non-public information at the time of the transaction. 4
These provisions, although they appear quite similar, are directed
at different persons as well as different information.9 5 "Article 190-2
deals with parties related to the issuer and information generated by
the issuer itself. Article 190-3 deals with parties related to the acquir-
ing company in a tender offer and information generated outside of the
87 See SEL, supra note 7, art. 190-2 and SEL, supra note 7, art. 190-3.
8 See SEL, supra note 7, art. 200.
8, SEL, supra note 7, art. 190-2 and SEL, supra note 7, art. 190-3.
*0 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1981).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
o' See Note, supra note 3, at 1313.
" Because of the lighter scienter requirements in Articles 190-2 and 190-3 as
compared to Article 58, it would be possible in theory to violate both provisions. Should
a violation of one of the specific provisions of Articles 190-2 and 190-3 be accompanied
by fraudulent intent, it would be possible to violate Article 58 as well, and thus be
subject to penalties under both provisions. See id.
" See SEL, supra note 7, art. 190-2 and SEL, supra note 7, art. 190-3. See also
Note, supra note 3, at 1313.
" See Note, supra note 3, at 1306.
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target company." '
9. ARTICLE 190-2
Under SEL Article 190-2, corporate insiders may not trade in the
securities (including options) of the listed companies in which they are
insiders if they are trading on the basis of material non-public informa-
tion 97 relating to that company." Based on this general rule, Article
190-2 looks very similar to Rule 10b-5. What makes the provision
unique is the detail with which it describes its terms.
10. INDIVIDUALS FALLING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 190-2
This prohibition against insider trading extends not only to "cor-
porate insiders" as defined by the article below, but also former corpo-
rate insiders99 who have ceased to be corporate insiders within the past
year, and "tippees" (those who are "tipped" inside information).' 00
The Article specifically defines each of these terms. For example, "cor-
porate insiders" are defined as follows:
(1) any officer, agent, employee or other personnel of such
company. . . when he has obtained the knowledge in con-
nection with his office;' 01
(2) any principal shareholder if he has obtained material
facts in connection with exercising his right to inspect the
books of the corporation;
10 2
(3) any person who possesses statutory authority over the
96 Id.
97 Certain stock transactions are exempt from Article 190-2's prohibition. These
transactions are:
(1) the exercise of warrants;
(2) the exercise of conversation rights;
(3) purchases or sales used for defensive reasons at the order of the com-
pany's board of directors in order to fend off a tender offer or similar
corporate action;
(4) purchase or sales ordered by the Ministry of Finance in order to stabi-
lize share prices;
(5) transactions that take place outside securities markets between corpo-
rate related parties or former corporate related parties or tippees;
(6) transactions in stock that are pursuant to contracts or agreements en-
tered into prior to when the "material facts" were obtained.
See SEL, supra note 7, art. 190-2, para. 5.
"s SEL, supra note 7, art. 190-2.
99 Id. at art. 190-2, para. 1.
100 See id. at art. 190-2, para. 3.
101 Id. at art. 190-2, para. 1, item (1).
102 Id. at art. 190-2, para. 1, item (2).
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company, when he has obtained the material knowledge in
connection with the exercise of such authority. (For example,
regulatory authorities given the right to inspect issuers
books);"'3
(4) any person, other than an Officer of the company, who
has obtained material information in connection with the ex-
ecution or the performance of such contract (e.g. lawyers,
accountants);
1 0 4
(5) directors or others of a legal entity falling within (2) or
(4) if they have obtained material facts in connection with
their duties.1 0 5
Individuals who no longer fall within any of the above five categories,
but have within the past year, are classified as "former corporate insid-
ers" under the Article and are subject to its prohibition against insider
trading. 0
These five specific categories have the benefit of clearly establish-
ing which individuals may not trade on inside information. Corre-
spondingly, this may better deter insider trading activity. However, the
law may be too limited in its scope. For example, in each of the five
categories, the statute requires that the individual obtain the informa-
tion "in connection with" her role as a "corporate insider."0 7 By im-
plication, the statute then appears to allow trades when the "corporate
insider," as defined by the Article, obtains information outside her role
with the corporation. For example, if an employee while not at work,
simply overhears a conversation containing material non-public infor-
mation about her company, it would appear that she could trade on this
information, even with the knowledge that it was material non-public
information. As the new amendments are purportedly based on general
notions of "fairness,"108 it seems contradictory to allow such a transac-
tion. If someone with an insider relationship to a corporation has infor-
mation, regardless of how that information was obtained, it would seem
patently unfair to allow her to trade on it if she knows it is material
213 Id. at art. 190-2, para. 1, item (3).
104 Id. at art. 190-2, para. 1, item (4).
105 Id. at art. 190-2, para. 1, item (5).
106 Id. at art. 190-2, para. 1.
107 Id. at art. 190-2, para. 1, items (1)-(5).
105 The Diet premised their 1988 amendments to the SEL on traditional notions
of "fairness," in that it is considered unfair for individuals, with special relationships to
issuing companies, to trade on information to which they have special access, but which
is unavailable to the public. The Diet believed that if this privileged trading was left
unregulated, it would undermine the perceived fairness of the securities markets, thus
destroying the trust of investors and their willingness to participate in the market. See
Note, supra note 3, at 1312.
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information unavailable to the rest of the investing public.
Similar limitations apply to the Article's definition of "tippees."
To be punished as a "tippee" under Article 190-2, a tippee "must
know that the tipper is a corporate-related person who has obtained the
information through employment or status, that the information is of
the type listed under Article 190-2... and that the information has not
been disclosed to the public."1 9 This provision forbids tippees from
trading until the information is made public.11
This provision, however, is hampered by several limitations. First,
if neither the tipper nor the tippee trades, the provision is not violated.
This situation does not exist in the United States because tippers may
be liable under Rule 10b-51" for the mere act of tipping.1 2 As Japan
did not implement a similarly strict law against this act, potential tip-
pers will remain undeterred. Moreover, under this Article, only the
first tippee is subject to insider trading liability."' Subsequent tippees
will not be punished, unless the first tippee acts solely as a conduit." 4
Clearly, many insider trades which most persons would view as wrong
would not violate Article 190-2.
11. DEFINITION OF MATERIAL FACTS
The Japanese Diet, motivated by a desire to avoid the vagueness
problems associated with Article 58, drafted very specific provisions re-
garding the type of information deemed an Article 190-2 "material
fact." To be material, information must fall within one of the following
specific provisions:
(1) a decision by the management of the company to imple-
ment any of the following or a decision by the management
of said company to reverse such a decision (which has been
made public):
(a) issuance of shares of stock, convertible bonds and
bonds with warrants to subscribe for new shares;
(b) reduction of stated capital;
(c) stock split;
10, See id. at 1314.
110 See SEL, supra note 7, art. 190-2, paras. 3-4.
m 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
... See Note, supra note 3, at 1314.
11" The rationale behind this rule was that the Japanese Diet wanted to establish
a bright line rule of liability that would be easy for all to follow. See id. (citing state-
ment by Mr. Fujita, the Director of the Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance,
House of Counselors Committee of Finance Report (15), 19-20 (May 19, 1988)).
11" See id.
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(d) declaration of a dividend or an interim cash distri-
bution during the fiscal year. . . provided that such
dividend or cash distribution differs in terms of amount
per share or method of distribution from the most re-
cent dividend or cash distribution, as the case may be;
(e) merger;
(f) transfer to, or acquisition from, a third party, of the
company's business in its entirety or in part;
(g) dissolution (other than dissolution as a result of a
merger);
(h) commercialization of a new product or new technol-
ogy;...115
(2) the occurrence of any of the following events:
(a) damage arising out of natural disaster or business
operations;
(b) change in the composition of those who constitute
Principal Stockholders;
(c) event which might cause a delisting of Listed Share
Certificates or Similar Instruments;...
(3) material change in sales, operating profit or new income
of said company. . . due to newly calculated projections for
the company or the results of the current fiscal year as com-
pared with the most recent projection that was previously
made public (or, in the case where there is no such projec-
tion, the results of the previous fiscal year that were made
public); . . . or
(4) material facts, other than facts referred to in the three
preceding Items, relating to the management, business, or
property of the company, which may have significant influ-
ence on the investment decisions of investors.11
To provide even greater specificity to the law, the Ministry of Finance
later passed Ministerial Ordinance No. 10 of 1989, which further de-
lineated what constitutes a material fact under this statute."17 The ap-
proach the Ministry adopted in this ordinance was not to define mate-
riality, but instead to define what was not material under this law.
115 See SEL, supra note 7, art. 190-2, para. 2, item 1.
116 See SEL, supra note 7, art. 190-2, para. 2, items 2-4.
117 See Ministry of Finance Ordinance No. 10 of 1989, art. 1 and 2, translated in
K. OKAMURA & C. TAKESHiTA, supra note 60. This ordinance, passed on February 3,
1989, also applies to the definition of material facts provided in SEL art. 190-3.
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Generally, this ordinance labels an event or corporate decision im-
material if it affects less than ten percent of the company's book value
of their total assets, as of the last day in the most recent fiscal year, or
ten percent of the company's sales in the most recent fiscal year." 8
This materiality test applies to natural disasters, mergers, acquisitions,
asset sales, transfers of part of the business, termination or establish-
ment of a business affiliation, as well as other events affecting the cor-
poration."' A slightly different standard is applied to the creation of a
new business or product. In these circumstances, the applicable test is
whether the new business or product:
in each fiscal year which commences within three years from
the beginning of the fiscal year during which the new busi-
ness [or product] is scheduled to be initiated, is expected to
be less than 10% of sales in the most recent fiscal year, pro-
vided that the total amount of costs specifically related to the
starting-up of such new business [or product] is expected to
be less than 10% of the book value of the fixed assets as of
the last day in the most recent fiscal year. 20
(first emphasis added).
As shown above, both the Ordinance and the law itself specifically
set forth what constitutes a material fact. This has the positive effect of
alerting all traders as to what constitutes an offense under the new laws
and allows them to alter their behavior accordingly. Alternatively, it
has the problem of leaving out some situations which most would con-
sider to be material, though not falling within the specific provisions of
the law. 21
One major problem associated with the new definition of material-
ity is the Ministry of Finance's "ten percent threshold test." Many
companies within Japan are simply so diverse that a rule requiring
them to disclose facts affecting sales or corporate assets by ten percent
or more would be inapplicable. For example, Hitachi published their
1a See id.
119 See id.
120 Id. at art. 1, item 10. This item covers the creation of new businesses. For the
item which covers the starting-up of a new product, see id. at art. 1, item 6.
121 Although item 4 of paragraph 2 in Article 190-2, supra, note 116, is a catch-
all provision, and thus could encompass violations that do not fit within the limits of
the other specific provisions, it seems unlikely that it will be used in this manner. The
Diet, in drafting such a specific law, clearly renounced the broad and vague language
that led to Article 58's lack of enforcement. The preceding three items in that para-
graph appear to overshadow this last provision. Although the language exists, should
someone try to use it, it seems any attempted application of item 4 would yield the
same poor results that Article 58 did.
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sales estimates for the year ending March 2, 1990 at 3.2 trillion yen. A
Hitachi official said, "I can't think of any new product that will boost
our sales by more than 320 billiori yen (ten percent). ' '122 Certainly the
development of a product, speculated to generate 319 billion yen in
sales, would be considered to be a material fact by most of the investing
public. Nevertheless, the current statute would classify such a develop-
ment as immaterial.
An additional flaw of the present definition of materiality is that it
only includes firm "corporation decisions." Thus, if an officer knows
that the corporation will pass a proposal to increase capital on the fol-
lowing day, that person may purchase shares of the corporation's stock
without being liable under the new laws for insider trading, since there
has not yet been a "decision" on that matter.123 Clearly, the investing
public could regard this knowledge to be a material fact in their deci-
sion to purchase or sell stock; nevertheless, Japanese law does not treat
it accordingly.
On balance, it is difficult to tell which approach yields the best
results. Greater specificity certainly makes violations easier to detect.
However, it problematically excludes many situations which, though
not within the act's language, may nevertheless be material in the eyes
of the investing public.
12. ARTICLE 190-3
Article 190-3, the counterpart to Article 190-2, regulates insider
trades on information regarding tender offers.124 This provision forbids
"tender offeror insiders" of acquiring corporations from trading on in-
formation, concerning either the termination or execution of a tender
offer, which they obtained through their relationship with the acquiring
company, until that information is disclosed to the public."25 As with
123 See Toshio Aritake, Looking Ahead, New Japan Securities Rules May Boost
Volatility, McGraw-Hill News, March 6, 1989.
123 See Note, -supra note 3, at 1316.
124 See SEL, supra note 7, art. 190-3.
12 Information is said to be made public when a chief executive officer or an
agent authorized for that purpose discloses that information to two "news media" com-
panies followed by a lapse of twelve hours. Under the statute, "news media" includes
(a) domestic newspaper publishing companies reporting current affairs, or news agen-
des communicating current affairs to those publishing companies; (b) daily domestic
newspaper publishing companies reporting business or economic events; or (c) the Ja-
pan Broadcasting Corporation, or other broadcasting stations. See Cabinet Order No.
23 of 1989, art. 30, translated in K. OKAMURA & C. TAKESHrrA, supra note 60. Note,
disclosure requirements are said to be satisfied if the information is reported to two
media sources and twelve hours have elapsed, even if the information has not yet been
provided to the public. Moreover, even if the information has been actually reported to
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Article 190-2, individuals claused as "tender offeror insiders" are spe-
cifically defined in Article 190-3. They include:
(1) any officer, agent or employee of a tender offeror when
he [sic] has obtained the knowledge in connection with his
[sic] office;
126
(2) any stockholder of a tender offeror when he [sic] has ob-
tained the knowledge in connection with the exercise of his
[sic] right to inspect the books of the offeror;
12 7
(3) any person who possesses statutory authority over a
tender offeror, when he [sic] has obtained the knowledge in
connection with the exercise of such authority;"2 8
(4) any person, other than an officer of the tender offeror, or
if the tender offeror is not a corporation, an agent or em-
ployee of the tender offeror, who has entered into a contract
with the tender offeror if when he [sic] has obtained the
knowledge in connection with the execution or the perform-
ance of such contract;.2 9 and
(5) any officer of a corporation where such corporation is a
person referred to in Item (2) or in Item (4) of Article 190-3
when he [sic] has obtained the knowledge in connection with
his [sic] office. 30
Additionally, as with Article 190-2, former "tender offeror insiders" 31
as well as "tippees" 13 2 are subject to the same prohibitions against trad-
ing as are the above described "tender offeror insiders".13 3
Unfortunately, Article 190-3 also has many of the same flaws in-
herent in Article 190-2. Article 190-3's definition of "tender offeror
insiders" also uses the "in connection with" language which may allow
the public, disclosure is not said to be satisfied if it was not based on a disclosure
statement by a chief executive officer or his authorized agent. See Note, supra note 3,
at 1318. Based on the above discussion, it is evident that there are serious flaws with
Japanese laws regarding public disclosure under 190-2 and 190-3. Perhaps a better
appr6ach would be to eliminate the requirement that the information must be based on
an official disclosure statement, and instead simply require that the information actu-
ally be reported to the public by two qualifying media. This approach would better
satisfy the true spirit of the reporting requirement, i.e. to ensure that the public is
basing their trades on the same information available to those inside the corporation.
I'l SEL, supra note 7, art. 190-3, para. 1, item 1.
112 Id. at art. 190-3, para. 1, item 2.
128 Id. at art. 190-3, para. 1, item 3.
129 Id. at art. 190-3, para. 1, item 4.
130 Id. at art. 190-3, para. 1, item 5.
231 Id. at art. 190-3, para. 1.
132 Id. at art. 190-3, para. 4.
1 In paragraph 6, Article 190-3 is also made subject to exemptions similar to
those that are listed in paragraph 5 of Article 190-2. See supra note 97.
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for some transactions which appear objectionable on fairness
grounds."" Additionally, Article 190-3 is governed by the same Minis-
terial Ordinance defining immateriality as Article 190-2.115 Thus, if a
tender offer affects less than ten percent of an acquiring company's
book value of its total assets or ten percent of its sales, it is considered
immaterial, and trades regarding such a tender offer would be permit-
ted prior to any public disclosure of the deal."' 8 As previously noted, a
tender offers affecting nine percent of the total sales or assets of a large
and diversified corporation,could be considered material to the investing
public. Nevertheless, Japanese law does not require disclosure prior to
trading on such information.
13. PENALTY PROVISIONS
Finally, the Japanese Diet enacted penalty provisions for failure
to comply with both Articles 190-2 and 190-3. Newly drafted Article
200 stipulates that Article 190-2 or 190-3 violators can receive up to six
months imprisonment with a requirement of labor, or a fine not to ex-
ceed five hundred thousand yen. 137 Unlike Article 189, Articles 190-2
and 190-3 do not provide for civil remedies - insider traders .who vio-
late either of these provisions are not required to disgorge their profits.
The justification for this is that neither of these provisions requires a
showing of culpability, thus stricter penalties are unwarranted. The
end result, however, is that violations of either Articles 190-2 or 190-3
are only mildly sanctioned. As insider trades can potentially reap huge
profits, the five hundred thousand yen fine and six months sentence
may provide little deterrence against this activity, particularly since
traders are currently allowed to keep their profits.
The Japanese, however, are not unaware of the problems inherent
in their penalty structure. Discussions concerning the availability of
civil remedies occurred during the drafting of the new 1988 Amend-
ments. Nevertheless, upon recommendations by the Securities Exchange
Council, it was decided that this issue should be postponed pending
further study.'38 Some Japanese commentators have recommended re-
1"' See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
236 See Ministry of Finance Ordinance No. 10 of 1989, translated in K.
OKAMURA & C. TAKESHrrA, supra note 60.
138 Id.
117 SEL, supra note 7, art. 200.
138 See Note, supra note 3, at 1315 n.168, citing Securities Exchange Council
Report, Naibusha torihiki no kisei no arikata ni tsuite [Ways to Regulate Insider
Trading], Feb. 24, 1988, which stated that "[mleasures should be taken to ensure the
effectiveness of civil damages payable to ... [aggrieved parties]. However, with respect
to the concept of damages sustained through ... [transactions] occurring on the stock
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quiring disgorgement of profits and compensation to aggrieved parties
in lieu of criminal penalties for Articles 190-2 and 190-3 violations.'" 9
The Securities Law may thus be further amended at some future point
in order to provide for such remedies. Until then, unfortunately, the
effectiveness of Articles 190-2 and 190-3 may be hampered by inade-
quate penalty provisions.
14. PROBABLE IMPACT OF THE NEW AMENDMENTS
As evidenced by the above discussion, Japan's new SEL amend-
ments are extensive.140 For the first time in Japanese history, the Diet
has made substantial efforts to deter insider trading. Though the new
articles are not problem-free, there is reason to hope for some change in
Japan's treatment of insider trades.
15. EVIDENCE THAT THE LAW MAY BE EFFECTIVE
Indeed there is evidence that those who participate in the Japanese
market are beginning to take the new laws seriously. Major brokerage
houses in Japan have begun to put up "Chinese Walls" to block the
flow of information between their corporate finance and retail broker-
age sections. 141 Such devices prohibit investment bankers from discuss-
ing their business deals with traders participating on the stock ex-
change, and thus provides one good means to help prevent insider
trading, if traders cannot get inside information, they cannot make in-
side trades.
United States brokerage houses have been using these "Chinese
Walls" for decades to separate investment bankers and floor traders.
However, until recently, "Japanese securities houses combined the
function of corporate investment banker and portfolio manager in one
division - sometimes even in one person.' 142 This system made insider
exchange, further study is required with regard to the standing of the plaintiff and
procedure of the lawsuit. Thus, it is necessary to tackle the issue as a long-term task."
139 See Note, supra note 3, at 1315.
"10 On a visit to Tokyo, in 1988, David Ruder, chairman of the United States
Securities and Exchange Council stated that the amended Securities and Exchange
Law covered "98% of what we cover in the United States." Jimbo, supra note 37, at
12.
141 See Jimbo, supra note 37, at 12, col. 3. Nomura Securities, Japan's largest
securities firm, created a "Chinese Wall" in August, 1988. See Sanger, supra note 16,
at D1, col. 3.
1 Sanger, supra note 16, at D5, col. 2. "If one person was in charge of Hitachi,
for example, he would oversee raising funds for Hitachi and also investing Hitachi's
holdings." Id. This structure made the practice of insider trading an almost irresistible
temptation.
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trading virtually inevitable.
There is hope that the implementation of "Chinese Walls" will
help eliminate the temptation to engage in insider trades. Indeed some
speculate that "Chinese Walls" will be "shockingly effective,"" 3 as in
most firms, the penalty for violating a "wall" will be dismissal."4 As a
director of Nomura Securities noted, "this is a strong penalty in a
country where lifetime employment is everything and a dismissed em-
ployee stands little chance of being hired elsewhere.""
In addition to the implementation of "Chinese Walls" there is
other evidence that the Japanese are not taking these amendments
lightly. For example, companies within Japan have become increas-
ingly cautious about giving information to stock analysts. Although ex-
isting law requires listed companies to disclose some details of their
performance to analysts, some analysts are now denied access to infor-
mation which was previously willingly disclosed due to fears of violat-
ing anti-disclosure laws absent the requisite public disclosure " 6 the
new statutes prescribe.4 7 Although these companies may be accused of
overreacting, this at least provides optimism for those hoping that the
new amendments are not disregarded like the old laws.
Finally, the Ministry of Finance has also taken affirmative steps
to help ensure the new laws' enforcement. In July of 1989, the Minis-
try appointed a special task force within its securities bureau to tighten
supervision over Japanese stock market activity, and to investigate all
future allegations of insider trading." Admittedly, this will still leave
the resources of Japan's supervisory teams behind those of the United
States. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the appointment of this new task
force will "go some way to answering criticism from the United States
and Europe that its rules on stock market behavior" and the enforce-
ment of such rules are too lax.14 9
16. REASONS TO DOUBT THE LAWS' SUCCESS
Despite the foregoing discussion, optimism about the amendment's
probable reduction of insider trading should be guarded for two rea-
14 See id. (quoting Mr. Yoshihiko Miyamoto, a director of Nomura Securities).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See Analysts Criticize Firms Over Insider Scare, KYODO NEWS SERVICE,
Aug. 11, 1989.
" For a discussion of what is required to disclose information publicly under the
new statute, see supra note 126.
148 See Ministry of Finance to Set Up Team to Tighten Supervision of Stock
Trading, KYODo NEWS SERVICE, May 31, 1989.
149 Id.
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sons. First, Japan is not a very litigious society, and thus may be un-
willing to vigorously enforce the recent legislation. This would certainly
be consistent with historical Japanese practices in this area. Secondly,
and more importantly, the prevalence of insider trading in Japan re-
flects Japanese cultural and business norms which may be too securely
institutionalized to be altered by the new laws.
While the historical failure of insider trading laws "might be at-
tributed to the fact that most Japanese do not think there is anything
wrong with insider trading," that is at best only a partial explana-
tion.' 50 Japan's failure to enforce these laws is a manifestation of fun-
damental Japanese attitudes towards law and litigation.' 5 ' Not only
have past insider trading laws been ignored, there has been "almost no
public or private enforcement of any of the provisions of the securities
law in Japan, whether or not they involve insider trading. "152
"The Japanese rarely litigate, nor do they use lawyers very
often."' 53 In 1984 Japan had only 12,000 lawyers; per capita this rep-
resented only one-seventeenth of that in the United States.'54 In 1982
alone, "the California state courts heard more than eleven times as
many civil cases, on a per capita basis, than did those of Japan."' 55
Similarly, the per capita number of civil lawsuits in the United King-
dom and West Germany, respectively, approximately ten and twelve
times that of Japan in the same year.' 6 In the securities area this dif-
ference has been even more extreme. Japan has seen only one private
action litigated under any of its Securities and Exchange Laws, and the
Ministry has never brought an action for injunctive relief.'5 7 In con-
trast, in the period between 1966 and 1973, there were at least 2,292
private securities actions brought in the Southern District of New York
alone.' 58
Two primary theories have been used to explain this striking lack
of litigation:
One view is that the Japanese culture values harmony and
conciliation; litigation is a threat to this cultural norm. A
variation on the 'cultural norm' explanation attributes the
180 See Banoff, supra note 10, at 166-67.
'8' See id. at 167.
152 Id.
18 Id.
14 Id. (citing Tanaka, The Role of Law in Japanese Society: Comparisons With
the West, 19 U. BRIT. COLum. L. REV. 375, 376 (1985)).
185 Banoff, supra note 10, at 167.
186 See id. at 167 n.186.
157 See id.
188 See id. at 167 n.1817.
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lack of civil litigation to a sharp traditional division between
the public and private spheres in Japan; private civil litiga-
tion simply is not used to enforce public goals.'" 9
A second theory is that Japan's institutional barriers to litigation
render it unprofitable.1 60 For example, in Japan, the securities laws
cannot be enforced through a class action. 161 Class actions, however,
may represent the only economically feasible means to bring an insider
trading suit." 2 Individual shareholders are simply not likely to be will-
ing to bear the huge costs of litigation, particularly given that they may
have little to gain through victory. Moreover, if an individual bringing
a securities suit loses, the individual would be forced to pay all the legal
costs incurred as Japan prohibits no contingent legal fees'63 - thus
providing an additional deterrent to securities litigation. Potential Japa-
nese litigants also suffer from limited discovery and a shortage of both
lawyers and judges.' 4
A noted Japanese scholar suggested that as Japan becomes in-
creasingly urban and industrial, litigation may become more respecta-
ble and barriers to it may fade.' 65 Until that time, however, it seems
unlikely that the new insider trading laws will be enforced with any
more vigor than the old laws. As long as the Japanese are unwilling to
take their violators to court, little will be done to curb insider trading.
Additionally, and more importantly, there are strong cultural
norms which may hinder the laws' ability to stop insider trading. In-
sider trading is-simply not viewed as wrong by many of the participants
in Japan's securities markets, rather it is viewed as a normal means of
conducting business. One stock analyst anonymously remarked that
"there's a completely different attitude about information . . .[in Ja-
pan]. The idea that information should be available equally to everyone
is quite a revolutionary idea."' 66
Japan is simply a different society. It has always been an insider
society where "the rights of the insider - the tight-knit village, the clan,
the alumni class - always have been paramount.' 6 Confidential infor-
16 See id. at 168.
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 In the United States, class actions are by far the most common means used to
enforce securities laws violations.
18. See Banoff, supra note 10, at 168.
'"See id.
x See id.
188 Hiatt & Shapiro, supra note 1, at A42, col. 1.
187 Id. (quoting Naohiro Amaya, a former top bureaucrat and respected Japanese
commentator).
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mation is often shared among tight interlocked groups of businesspeople
in order to cement their business relationships. This sharing of inside
information may be a prerequisite to entering Japan's closed and elite
business groups.'68
To most familiar with Japanese culture, it is unthinkable that the
new laws will have much impact in deterring this prevalent and widely
accepted activity. This practice of "gift giving" is simply too deeply
ingrained in Japanese society.
Politicians, manufacturers, financiers, and employees all pull
together for Japan's advancement. . . . They throw business
to each other. . . . And they quietly look the other way
when a questionable gift is given, a product's price is fixed, a
stock is manipulated, or a bit of inside information is passed
along.
1 6 9
Securities brokers have ascended the corporate ladder by exchanging
inside information with their colleagues from the moment they gradu-
ated from college:170 "[tihe idea that they will stop swapping the infor-
mation that has been the lifeblood of their work, one Japanese broker
said with some understatement 'strains credulity.' "171
17. CONCLUSION
The recent, widely publicized scandals in Japan manifest Japan's
changing attitude toward insider trading.77 This change and the enact-
ment of the 1988 SEL amendments are cause for optimism concerning
the potential decline of insider activity in the Japanese markets. The
law, however, is hampered by flawed language and the cultural institu-
tionalization of insider trading as business etiquette. Traditionally, Ja-
pan has been an insider society, and consequently, insider trading is not
perceived to be wrong. Rather, most view it as a necessary component
to successfully conducting affairs in Japan's tightly knit business
community.
Thus the new law must not only end an extremely prevalent prac-
tice in a society which rarely seeks to enforce its laws, but to be truly
effective it must also change Japanese views regarding the acceptability
of insider trading. This may be an insurmountable task. For a nation
such as Japan, which must also overcome a history of unenforced se-
168 Id.
"' Yemma, supra note 40, at 11.
171 See Sanger, supra note 16, at D1, col. 3.
171 Id.
171 See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
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curities laws, the total realization of these goals may be unachievable.
The law may, however, help start to erode the Japanese institutional-
ization practice of insider trading. At a minimum the amendments re-
present an affirmative step towards eliminating the "insider's heaven"
that currently exists on Japanese stock exchanges.
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